Case Marking and Islandhood In EST: Evidence from Quechua by Cole, Peter & Hermon, Gabriella
40 
CASE MARKING AND ISLANDHOOD IN EST: EVIDENCE FROM QUECHUA 
Peter Cole and Gabriella Hermon 
University of Illinois 
I. Introduction 
There are certain syntactic properties associated with sen-
tences like (1) in English. 
(1) Frank believes ~Charlesl to be asleep. 
{him/*he) 
Sentences like (1) differ from those like (2) in a number of ways. 
(2) Frank believes S[that ~Charles1 is asleep.] 
lhe/*him) 
First, the underlying complement subject of (1) (Charles) is sus-
ceptible to a variety of syntactic rules, while that of (2) is not. 
Some examples of this difference are given in (3)-(6). 
(3) Passivization 
a. Charles is believed by Frank to be asleep. 
b. *Charles is believed by Frank that is asleep. 
(4) Reciprocal Interpretation 
a. Charles and Frank believe each other to be asleep. 
b. *Charles and Frank believe that each other are asleep. 
(5) Disjoint Reference 
a. Charles. believes ~*him~. to be asleep. 
1 { him:J 
b. Charles. believes that fie. . is asleep. 
(6) Reflexive Ifiterpretation i,J 
a. Charles believes himself to be asleep. 
b. *Charles believes that himself is asleep. 
Second, the complement clause in (1) is non-finite (untensed), 
while that in (2) is finite. Third, the underlying complement sub-
ject in (1) appears in accusative case, while that in (2) is in 
nominative case. 
Within generative syntax there have been two widely accepted 
explanations proposed for the differences between (1) and (2). In 
the Standard Theory the properties of (1) have been analysed as due 
to the application of Subject to Object Raising (SOR). This rule 
is claimed to map an underlying structure like (7) onto a derived 
structure roughly like (8). 
(7) 
(8) 
V S[NP2 VP]] 
V NP 2 S[~ to VP]] 
~ Peter Cole and Gabriella Hermon 1979. 
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The differences between (1) and (2) are claimed to be due to the fact that (1) has a derived structure like (8), while the derived 
structure of (2) is like (7). The rules in (3)-(6) are assumed to be clause bounded. Thus, they apply to the raised (accusative) NP, but not to the unraised (nominative) NP. 
In contrast to the raising analysis, within the framework of the Extended Standard Theory (EST), it has been proposed that (1) has a structure like (7) in both underlying and derived structure. According to this approach, the differences between (1) and (2) 
are not due to the derived constituency of the complement subject (which is claimed to be the same in both sentences), but rather to differences in the internal structure of the complement clause. In the most recent version of EST, that proposed by Chomsky (1978) in "On Binding", the determining factor is the superficial case 
marking of the complement subject. More specifically, nominative NPs are, in effect, islands with relpect to syntactic rules (the Nominative Island Condition [NIC]). It is the islandhood of n~m­inative NPs that explains the distribution observed in (3)-(6). The two approaches make radically different claims regarding the structure of complex sentences and the conditions on rule 
application. How might the approaches be distinguished? One pos-
sibility is to look at the implications of the two analyses for 
other aspects of English grammar. Although promising in princi-ple, in practice it has been impossible to reach a definitive 
resolution to the controversy in this way. Both analyses appear 
to account for roughly the same range of data in English. (See Postal (1974), Bresnan (1976)~ Baeh (1977) and Postal (1977).) A more practical way to distinguish between the two anal-yses is cross-linguistic. Do other languages exhibit an array of facts similar to that found in English? If so, can one of the 
approaches be generalized cross-linguistically while the other 
cannot? If it can be shown that one approach explains similar data in a broad range of languages, while the other is linked to peculiarities of English, the approach with wide cross-linguistic 
application is clearly to be preferred. 
In the sections which follow we examine certain aspects of 
complementation in Imbabura Quechua (IQ). We show that data anal-
ogous to (3)-(6) cannot be due to surface case marking. Rather, 
they would appear to be due to the derived constituency of the 
underlying complement subject. This suggests that a raising anal-ysis is to be preferred for IQ. If raising is found to be the preferred analysis in all languages in which the facts distinguish between the two analyses, this would constitute strong evidence 
that SOR is the correct analysis whenever a range of facts like 
that seen in (1)-(6) occurs. 
II. Complementation in Imbabura Quechua 
IQ is spoken in Northern Ecuador and is a member of the Que-
chua A branch of the Quechua language family (cf. Parker 1969). As in most varieties of Quechua, complement clauses are generally 
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nominalized, and the complement clause is case marked in terms of 
its grammatical role in the matrix clause, as is illustrated in 
(9). 
(9) Maria-ca cri-n Francisco cay-pi 
Maria-topic believe-3 Francisco this-in 
'Maria believes that Francisco is here.' 
ca-j-ta 
be-pres Norn-ace 
In addition to sentences like (9) in which the complement subject 
appears in nominative case, there is an additional pattern in 
which the complement subject is marked accusative: 
(10) Complement Subject in Accusative Case in IQ 
Maria-ca Francisco-ta cri-n cay-pi 
Maria-topic Francisco-ace believe-3 this-in 
ca-j-ta 
be-pres Norn-ace 
'Maria believes Francisco to be here.' 
Sentences like (9) and (10) differ in much the same way that 
sentences (1) and (2) differ in English. The nominative underly-
ing subject fails to undergo a variety of syntactic rules under-
gone by the accusative: 
(11) Disjoint Reference in 











'Jose. believes him. to have come yesterday.' 
b. Jose.i cri-n pay .. cayna shamu-shca-ta 
Josei believe-3 he-fio~ yesterday come-past Norn-ace 
'Jose believes that he .. came yesterday.' 
(12) -llataj Reflexivization iniIQ 
a. Jose. cri-n pay-lla-ta-taj. wasi-ta 
Josei believe-3 himself-ace i house-ace 
randi-shca-ta 
buy-past Norn-ace 
'Jose. believes himself. to have bought the house.' 
b. *Jose.icri-n pay-lli-taj. wasi-ta randi-shca-ta 
Josei believe-3 himself-nomi house-ace buy-past Norn-ace 
('Jose. believes that himself. bought the house.') 
(13) Object VerB Agreement in IQ i 
a. Jose nuca-ta yacha-wa-n Maria-ta juya-j-ta 
Jose I-ace know-1-3 Maria-ace love-pres Norn-ace 
'Jose knows me to love Maria.' 
b. *Jose yacha-wa-n nuca Maria-ta juya-j-ta 
Jose know-1-3 I-nom Maria-ace love-pres Norn-ace 
('Jose knows me that I love Maria.') 
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These "islandhood" facts would appear on first examination to be 
analyzable in the same way as the parallel English examples, either in terms of derived constituency (the raising analysis) or surface 
case (the NIC analysis). But, as will be seen shortly, this is not 
the case. 
III. Nominative Case and Islandhood 
It will be recalled that, according to NIC, it is surface 
case marking that determines islandhood. A noun phrase bearing 
nominative case is an island, while accusatives and obliques are 
not. We shall show in this section that it is not case marking in IQ, but, rather, subjecthood, which determines whether a noun phrase is an island. There is a class of verbs, the subjects of 
which receive accusative case. We shall show that despite having 
accusative case, these noun phrases pattern with the nominative 
complement subjects in (11)-(13) rather than with the accusatives. 
The noun phrases in question are the subjects of two classes 
of verbs, -naya- desiderative experiencers, and lexical exper-iencers: 
(14) -naya Desiderative Experiencers 
Jose-ta punu-naya-n 
Jose-ace sleep-desid-3 
'Jose wants to sleep, Jose is sleepy.' (15) Lexical Experiencers 
Jose-ta rupa-n 
Jose-ace be-hot-3 
'Jose is hot.' 
There are a variety of arguments that the accusative nominal 
Jose-ta is the subject in sentences like (14) and (15). One class 
of arguments is presented in Cole and Jake (1978). In addition, it can be shown that these noun phrases act like subjects with 
respect to the Opacity Condition (Chomsky 1978). See Cole and 
Hermon (1979) and Hermon (to appear) for details. We shall show 
now that the subjects of (14)-(15) behave like nominative noun phrases. These facts are compatible with the raising analysis, but not with an analysis in which islandhood is taken to reflect 
surface case marking. 
IV. Disjoint Reference 
As predicted by the NIC analysis, nominative complement sub-jects fail to undergo disjoint reference, a rule of construal 
that marks anaphors as obligatorily non-coreferential with a potential antecedent. In (16) disjoint reference has not applied: 
(16) Disjoint Reference Does Not Apply to Nominative Subject 
Jose. crin pay. . micu-ju-j-ta 
Jose1 believes he[flo~] eat-prog-pres Norn-ace 
'Jose. believes that he .. is eating.' l l,J 
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In contrast, disjoint reference does apply to accusative under-
lying subjects in sentences like (16), as is shown in (Ila) 
(repeated) . 




Reference in IQ 
*pay-tai cayna 
pay-ta. 
Jose believe-3 he-accJ yesterday come-past Norn-ace 
'Jose. believes him.to have come yesterday.' 
1 J 
But NIC makes incorrect preditions with regard to accusative 
experiencers like those in (14) and (15). Accusative experiencers 
pattern with nominatives rather than with accusatives like those 
in (lla). This is illustrated in (17). 
(17) a. Disjoint Reference Does Not apply to Desiderative 
Experiencer Subject 
Josei cri-n pay-tai j micu-naya-j-ta 
Jose believe-3 he-ace ' eat-desid-pres Norn-ace 
'Jose. believes that he .. wants to eat.' 
b. Disjoint Reference Do~s Not Apply to Lexical 
Experiencer Subject 
Jose. cri-n pay-ta. . rupa-j-ta 
Jose1 believe-3 he-acc1 'J hot-pres Norn-ace 
'Jose. believes that he .. is hot.' 1 1,J 
These facts constitute a straightforward counter-example to the 
claim that surface case marking determines islandhood. If that 
claim were correct, why would accusative experiencers be islands 
just like nominative noun phrases? But the raising analysis has 
no difficulty explaining these facts. Nominatives and accusative 
experiencers are "islands" because they remain constituents of the 
complement clause. In contrast, accusatives in sentences like 
(Ila) are accessible to disjoint reference because they are matrix 
direct objects in derived structure. 
An additional fact for which the NIC hypothesis provides no 
explanation, but which is an automatic consequence of the raising 
analysis, is the contrast between (Ila) and (18). 
(18) a. Disjoint Reference Applies with Desiderative Experiencer 
Subject Which Precedes Matrix Verb 
Jose-ca. *pay-tai cri-n micu-naya-j-ta 
1 pay-ta. 
Jose-topic he-accJ believe-3 eat-desid-pres Norn-ace 
'Jose. believes him. to want to eat.' 
b. Disjoint RefereJce Applies with Lexical Experiencer 
Subject Which Precedes Matrix Verb 
Jose-ca. *pay-tai cri-n rupa-j-ta 
1 pay-ta. 
Jose-topic he-accJ believe-3 hot-pres Norn-ace 
'Jose. believes him. to be hot.' 
1 J 
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The ra1s1ng analysis must claim that the accusative experien-cer in (18) has undergone raising since the underlying complement subject appears to the left of the matrix verb. Thus, it would be predicted that disjoint reference would apply, and pay-ta would be marked as obligatorily non-coreferential to the matrix subject. The NIC analysis, in contrast, would predict that disjoint refer-ence would apply in both (lla) and (18). It provides no explana-tion for the contrast. 
V. Validator Placement 
A second rule that groups nominative complement subjects and accusative experiencers together in contrast to other underlying accusative subjects (like (10)) is validator placement. Valida-tors indicate the evidential status of the sentence. In general, the placement of validators is free. There is, however, an important restriction on their placement which is illustrated in (19). 
(19) Validator Placement in IQ 
a. Juan-mi cri-n Maria Jose-ta ricu-shca-ta Juan-valid believe-3 Maria Jose-ace see-past Norn-ace 1 It is Juan who believes that Maria saw Jose. I b. Juan cri-n-mi Maria Jose-ta ricu-shca-ta Juan believe-3-valid Maria Jose-ace see-past Norn-ace 
'Juan believes [e.g., but doesn't know] that Maria saw Jose.' 
c. *Juan cri-n Maria-mi Jose-ta ricu-shca-ta Juan believe-3 Maria-valid Jose-ace see-past Norn-ace ('It's Maria who Juan believes saw Jose.') d. *Juan cri-n Maria Jose-ta-mi ricu-shca-ta Juan believe-3 Maria Jose-ace-valid see-past Norn-ace ('It's Jose who Juan believes Maria saw.') 
e. *Juan cri-n Maria ricu-shca-mi Jose-ta Juan believe-3 Maria see-past Norn-valid Jose-ace ('Juan believes that Maria saw [e.g., not heard] Jose.') 
As is shown in (19), the validator -mi 'first hand information' may not appear on constituents of thecomplement clause including nominative complement subjects. It may, however, be suffixed to accusative underlying subjects like that in (20). 
(20) Accusative Underlying Complement Subjects Can 






'It is Francisco whom Maria knows to have come home.' 












'It is Francisco whom Maria knows to have come home.' 
The facts given so far are compatible with both the raising and 
the NIC analyses. 
But the NIC analysis provides no explanation for the fact 
that the accusative experiencers in (21) cannot be validated. 
(21) a. -naya Desiderative Experiencer Subjects 
*Maria--cilshi cushi paypaj wawa-ta-mi 
Maria happy happy her child-ace-valid 
micu-naya-chun 
eat-desid-subjunc Norn 
('Maria is very happy that her child [e.g., not her hus-
band] wants to eat. 1 ) 
b. Lexical Experiencer Subjects 
*Maria cushi cushi Jose-ta-mi wasi-man 
Maria happy happy Jose-ace-valid house-to 
shamu-ngapaj muna-chun 
come-subjunc Norn want-subjunc Norn 
('Maria is very happy that Jose [e.g., not Francisco] 
wants to come home.') 
This state of affairs is predictable on the basis of the raising 
analysis. The accusative experiencers in (21) are embedded 
beneath a matrix adjective (cushi 'happy') and, thus, cannot be 
raised into the matrix clause:--'fhis explains their islandhood. 
In contrast, the matrix predicate in (20) is a raising trigger 
(yacha- 'knowi). The underlying complement subject has been 
raised into the matrix clause, which explains the possibility of 
validation. 
VI. Conclusions 
We have shown that in IQ the islandhood of certain comple-
ment subjects cannot be due to surface case marking, as Chomsky 
(1978) claimed in ''On Binding, 3 but, rather, seems to be due to 
derived constituent structure. As far as we know, there are no 
languages in which there is strong evidence favoring a surface 
case analysis. This suggests that the analysis proposed in Chom-
sky (1978) is based on a peculiarity of English, the fact that in 
English case marking and subjecthood show a high correlation. 
When such a correlation exists, it is hard to determine whether a 
particular syntactic phenominon (e.g., islandhood with respect to 
the rules in (3)-(6)) is due to nominative case or subjecthood. 
Our data suggest, however, that when nominative case and subject-
hood are differentiated in a language, it will be found that 
islandhood is a property of complement subjects rather than 
nominative NPs. 




*This paper is part of a larger project in which we seek to deter-
mine the extent to which the major claims of relationally based cross-linguistic syntax must be incorporated into the Extended Standard Theor~ (EST). The purpose of this paper is to present evidence that Chomsky's (1978) proposals regarding the role of surface case in grammar appear to be based on peculiarities of English, and, thus, not to be gen-
eralizabl.e cross-linguistically. For a fuller treatment of this question, see Cole and Hermon (1979). 
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1The Nominative Island Condition is formulated as a condition 
on the binding of variables in Logical Form. The condition acts in effect as a filter at the level of Logical Form, marking as ill-formed any derivation in which there is involvement between 
a nominative noun phrase and an element outside the clause contain-ing the nominative. (This does not affect wh-movement for reasons 
we shall not discuss here. See Chomsky (1978) for details.) 
2It should also be noted that in the framework of EST, the 
rules in (~-(6) are not assumed to be clause bounded. In Cole 
and Hermon (1979) we examine the possibility of modifying the "On Binding" framework so as to include a rule of SOR and a Subject Island Condition. In that analysis, rules like those in (3)-(6) 
need not be clause bounded. 
3There are several additional arguments that we have omitted here for reasons of space. See Cole and Hermon (1979). 
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